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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH, by and through its
ENGINEERING COMMISSION, D.
H. WHITTENBTTRG, Chairman, H.
J. CORLEISSEN and L A Y T O N
MAXFIELD, Members of the Engineering Commission,
Plaintiff and Respondent, I Case No.
[
7867
vs.
BURTON F. PEEK and CHARLES D.
WIMAN, Trustees under the Will and
of the Estate of C H A R L E S H.
DEERE, Deceased,
Defendants and Appellants.

I.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Chapter 13, First Special Session, Laws of Utah
1951, became effective June 18th of that year. (Session
Laws, p. 17.) By that Act plaintiff was required "forthwith" to condemn for State Park purposes a large tract
of land specifically described by metes and bounds. (Act,
1
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Sec. 8a.) Pursuant thereto on July 10, 1951 the Engineering Commission passed a "Condemnation Resolution"
(R. 5) and immediately thereafter filed its complaint in
the District Court of Salt Lake County. (Case No. 92516.)
This complaint contains the usual averments to
support the prayer for condemnation, sets forth the interests which the various defendants may have or claim,
and then ipsa dixit allocates the land to be condemned
and the interests of the various defendants into twentyeight "parcels" and two additional "outstanding interests". (R. 1-20.) Twenty-seven of these "parcels" consist of described tracts owned by named defendants other
than the appellants. (R. 6-15.) "Parcel 28" is then in
effect described as the entire property exactly as set out
in the legislative mandate, less the twenty-seven other
described parcels and some other interests for unassigned
reasons also excluded. (R. 15-17.)
The tract which the Utah Legislature at its special
session commanded plaintiff "to forthwith condemn" is
an area of several square miles located at the mouth of
Emigration Canyon east of Salt Lake City. It includes
130.23 acres of a total of approximately 215.73 acres
owned by these particular defendants and appellants in
the general vicinity; the J e r r y Jones tract of 5.7 acres;
the Tedesco tract of 6.46 acres; the Wheelwright tract
of 9.41 acres; twenty-six individual subdivided residential lots comprising a total of some 8 acres owned by
various defendants, on some of which homes were in
various stages of construction; and 7.66 acres of dedicated streets other than the State Highway through
2
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Emigration Canyon with its branch to the adjacent
Monument and the main County Road leading to the
south. The area was in various stages of development
from bare mountainside to completed residences in
platted and restricted subdivisions wherein were in place
dedicated streets, curb and gutter, drainage facilities,
fire hydrants and the usual utilities of water, power,
telephone and gas. (R. Ex. 1, p. 154.)
Because of the large extent of the area involving
numerous defendants and interests, pursuant to Section
104-35-6 of the Judicial Code and Rule 42(b) Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure plaintiff asked the court in its discretion to sever issues pertaining to these particular
defendants (R. 51); and the court so ordered (R. 51, 82).
It was also ordered pursuant to stipulation that a separate record in this case should be maintained pertaining
to these parties only (R. 89-90), hereinafter referred to
as the "plaintiff" and the "Deere Estate" or "defendants".
In addition to the usual prayer for condemnation
the complaint prayed for an order of immediate occupancy "for the purpose of commencing such construction
and improvement of a State Park." (R. 19.) However,
the Legislature had enacted no plans for such construction and improvement beyond the bare condemnation
mandate, and this motion was not pressed but in fact
wTas resisted by plaintiff. (R. 82.) Summons was served
on July 12, 1951, whereupon there became applicable the
provisions of Section 104-34-11 of the Judicial Code,
which reads as follows:
3
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104-34-11.

When Right to Damages Deemed
Have Accrued.

to

For the purpose of assessing compensation
and damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to
have accrued at the date of the service of summons, and its actual value at that date shall be
the measure of compensation for all property to
be actually taken, and the basis of damages to
property not actually taken, but injuriously affected, in all cases where such damages are
allowed, as provided in the next preceding section.
No improvements put upon the property subsequent to the date of service of summons shall be
included in the assessment of compensation or
damages.
By its separate answer (K. 21-42) the Deere Estate
raised as an issue the necessity for the condemnation,
from an adverse determination of which no appeal is
taken. Defendants also raised therein the dual issues of
first, the extent of the property to be condemned in terms
of "separate parcels" and parts thereof; and secondly, the
time of and extent of the damage resulting from the
taking, for which the State and Federal Constitutions
guaranteed the condemnee "just compensation".
Plaintiff's motion to strike the answer was granted
as to all affirmative matters therein (E. 21, 43).
(a) More specifically, the answer (E. 12) denied
the State's allegation that the Deere Estate property
consisted of but a single parcel, or "the whole of an
entire parcel". (E. 19.) Defendants in their answer set
forth in detail their contention as to each of the parcels

4
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involved and the fair market values thereof as of July
12, 1951 (R. 21-39). The separate answer also set forth
defendants' claims for severance damages (R. 39-40).
In this connection the applicable portions of Section
104-34-10 of the Judicial Code read as follows:
104-34-10.

Compensation
Assessed.

and damages — How

The court, jury or referee must hear such
legal evidence as may be offered by any of the
parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must
ascertain and assess:
(1) The value of the property sought to be
condemned and all improvements thereon appertaining to the realty, and of each and every separate estate or interest therein; and if it consists
of different parcels, the value of each parcel and of
each estate or interest therein shall be separately
assessed.
(2) If the property sought to be condemned
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the
damages which will accrue to the portion not
sought to be condemned by reason of its severance
from the portion sought to be condemned and the
construction of the improvement in the manner
proposed by the plaintiff.
#

#

#

(5) As far as practicable compensation must
be assessed for each source of damages separately.
(Chapter 58, Laws of Utah 1951.)
The essential physical facts as to the nature of the
Deere Estate property—a total of approximately 215.73
acres in the vicinity—are not in dispute. The property is
5
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described in detail in the separate answer (R. 21-42), the
Bray ton affidavit (R. 41-47), the supplemental Brayton
affidavit (R. 68-77); and its characteristics are shown in
the maps attached to the separate answer, the court's
order of March 5, 1952 (R. 81-88) and the large maps
which are Exhibits 1 and B. For a ready reference defendants suggest use of the map found at page 78 of the
record reproduced herein, or that between pages 47 and
48 of the record, which is a workable reduction of the
larger maps.
In barest outline the Deere Estate property north of
Emigration Canyon Road included 21 of a total of 38
platted lots in Oak Hills Plat "A," a recorded residential
subdivision; 41 of a total of 46 lots in the immediately
adjacent unrecorded Oak Hills subdivision; and a 3.96acre area known as I-C. All of these, together with
Tract I-D a mile to the south and completely segregated,
were lumped together as "Parcel 1" by the court's order
of March 5,1952. (R. 81-88.) Also on the north side of the
canyon were 51 of a total of 55 partially subdivided lots
in an area still further to the north and east known as
IV-A; and finally all of the remaining land, largely unimproved or "raw," colored on the maps in brown and blue
and known as areas I I and VI. Included on the extreme
east end of Tract VI was the Deere Estate water source
and collecting system, with transmission and distribution
lines extending to the platted lots to the west.
On the south side of Emigration Canyon Road, in
addition to Tract I-D in the extreme southwest corner,
was the remaining "bottom land" alongside Emigration
6
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Canyon stream, Area I I I ; a completely isolated area to
the east, Area V ; the acreage north of dedicated Kennedy Drive extending to the brow of the plateau; and
finally a part only of the area south of Kennedy Drive,
severed from the balance of the Deere Estate's remaining
property extending still further to the south by the
straight line boundary of the legislative fiat. The court's
order of March 5, 1952 lumped all of this into "Parcel 2",
together with all of those portions on the north side of
Emigration Canyon not included in "Parcel 1." (R. 8188 and map a part of this order, and Ex. B.)
Included with the condemned land in addition to the
water system were various interests in streets, water
rights and other items the details of which are not
involved in this appeal. Some of these interests plaintiff
itself excluded from consideration in the condemnation
proceeding for various reasons not here involved, and
others were excluded by the court but are not involved
in this appeal.
Rejecting both plaintiff's contention that defendants'
land consisted of but the single "Parcel 28," and defendants' contention that many separate parcels were involved, the court initially determined on the basis of the
Brayton affidavit and defendants' answer to interrogatories (R. 44-47, 57-58) that defendants' property to be
condemned consisted of these two, and only two "parcels,"
all of each of which was to be condemned with accordingly
no severance damage. (R. 81-88 and map attached to this
order, par. 4 thereof, R. 92.)
7
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An application for an interlocutory appeal from this
crucial order was denied by this court. (Case No. 7839.)
The District Court thereafter consistently adhered
to this "two-parcel decision" and its resultant implications when from time to time issues pertaining thereto
were raised during the further proceedings, such as by
defendants' proposed Instructions 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18
and 20. (R. 100-110.) All evidence as to severance damage
was excluded and eliminated from consideration by the
j u r y ; e.g., the court refused to give defendants' requested
Instructions Nos. 13, 14 and 16. (R. 105-108.) These defendants duly excepted to the court's instructions, which
were given consistently in accordance with its initial
"two-parcel" order, e.g., Instructions 6, 8 and 9. (R. 112114). The court rejected all evidence as to lot values,
etc. (R. 95-96.) The water system was lumped in as
part of "Parcel 2." (R. 97-98.)
(b) Also alleged in the answer and stricken was
defendants' averment that under the circumstances of this
case and the application of the special legislative mandate to this particular property, the effective date of taking for all practical purposes, and thus the time of accrual of defendants' constitutional right to damages, was
July 12, 1951, the date summons was served; and the damages thus would include not only the fair market value
of the property taken as of that date, but also interest
thereon from that date until payment, (R. 40.)
As to this issue, the court likewise continued to
adhere to its early decision that the time of taking of
8
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both title and possession would not be until entry of the
condemnation judgment (May 27, 1952); therefore the
award of just compensation should not include interest
from July 12, 1952 until time of payment. For example,
a requested instruction to allow interest was refused
(R. I l l ) ; and defendants' motion to include such interest
in the judgment on the verdict (R. 127-128) was denied.
(R, 129.)
Judgment on the jury's verdict was in due course
made and entered May 10,1952. (R. 117-126.) Thereafter
plaintiff deposited with the court its draft for the amount
of the jury's verdict and costs. (R. 130.) On May 27,1952
the court made and entered the usual condemnation judgment whereby plaintiff took title and possession. (R, 131139.)
From both the judgment on the verdict and the final
judgment of condemnation, defendants on June 9, 1952
appealed to this court. (R. 146.)
II.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The court improperly refused to award defendants as a part of the just compensation to be paid pursuant to state and federal Constitutions not only the fair
market value of defendants' property as of the date taken,
but in addition interest upon that fair market value computed at the legal rate from July 12, 1951 until May 10,
1952, when the fair market value was determined.
2.

The court improperly refused to allow these de9
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fendants to cross examine plaintiff's expert witnesses on
the subject of the actual market values of comparable
property as of July 12, 1951, and likewise excluded evidence as to the actual market values of such comparable
properties.
3. The court below improperly refused to allow appellants to introduce evidence relating to the fair market
value of the Deere Estate water utility system or any part
thereof.
4. The court improperly, ruled that the property
of appellants under condemnation consisted of the whole
of but two separate parcels, each to be separately assessed.
5. The court improperly eliminated the issue of
severance damages.
III.
ARGUMENT
Point.
1. The court improperly refused to award defendants
as a part of the just compensation to be paid pursuant to
state and federal Constitutions not only the fair market
value of defendants' property as of the date taken, but in
addition interest upon that fair market value computed at
the legal rate from July 12, 1951 until May 10, 1952, when
that fair market value was determined.
Utah took from the owners the Deere Estate property when pursuant to specific legislative mandate, summons was served July 12, 1951. Possession as such became worthless the moment the special legislation was
10
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enacted; certainly not later than the time summons was
served. For practical and moral purposes this had actually occurred when Chapter 13 became effective June 18,
1951, for the owners could hardly continue their development operations in the light of an inevitable acquisition
by the State.
Not only was there no value to the temporarily extended bare right of possession of this property which
could no longer be sold, improved, developed or used.
Actually it was a burden, for defendants were required
to continue operation of its pumps to keep the water system from freezing. When defendants called up plaintiff's
motion for occupancy, the plaintiff resisted its own motion. (R. 82.) Yet the court below refused to permit proof
of the obvious facts showing the deprivation of defendants' property, and struck defendants' averments in their
answer with respect thereto. (R. 21, 42.)
Article I of Utah's Constitution reads in part as follows:
Sec. 7.

(Due process of law.)

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law.
Sec. 22.

(Private property for public use.)

Private property shall not be taken or damages for public use without just compensation.
Likewise, payment of "just compensation" is required
of the State of Utah by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution, the test being the same as is required of the Federal Government itself under the Fifth
11
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Amendment. For example, see Orgel on Valuation under
Eminent Domain, Section 5, page 17, wherein it is said:
"Since the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution is binding on every state,
this requirement (of just compensation) determines the minimum basis of compensation
throughout the entire United States."
The United States Supreme Court has phrased "just
compensation" to be "the full and perfect equivalent of
the property taken." Without elaborating principles now
so fundamental a part of the law of eminent domain, we
invite attention to the following key cases:
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy RR. Co. v.
Chicago,
166 U.S. 226, 41 L. ed. 979, 17 S. Ct. 581;
Ettor v. Tacoma,
228 U.S. 148, 57 L. ed 733, 33 S. Ct. 428;
McCov v. Union Elevated RR. Co.,
247 U.S. 354, 62 L. ed. 1158, 38 S. Ct. 504;
Bragg v. Weaver,
251 U.S. 57, 64 L. ed. 135, 40 S. Ct. 62;
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Ry. Co. v.
Morristown,
276 U.S. 182, 72 L. ed. 523, 48 S. Ct. 276;
Olson v. United States,
292 U.S. 246, 78 L. ed. 1236, 54 S. Ct. 704;
Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States,
261 U.S. 299, 304, 306, 43 S. Ct. 354, 256,
67 L. ed. 664.
Allowance of interest pursuant to the overriding constitutional provisions is implied in the absence of express
12
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statutory authorization of such. Otherwise the condemnation legislation would violate the federal and usually
also the applicable state constitutional provisions. Simmons v. Dillon, (W. Va.) 193 S.E. 331, 113 A.L.K. 787.
Thus in the Seaboard Air Line case cited above, the
court held:
"The compensation to which the owner is entitled is the full and perfect equivalent of the property taken. Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United
States, (supra) 148 U.S. 312, 13 S. Ct. 622, 37 L.
Ed. 463. It rests on equitable principles and it
means substantially that the owner shall be put in
as good position pecuniarily as he would have been
if his property had not been taken. (Citing cases.)
lie is entitled to the damages inflicted by the taking . . .
"Where the LTnited States condemns and takes
possession of land before ascertaining or paying
compensation, the owner is not limited to the value
of the property at the time of the taking; he is entitled to such addition as will produce the full equivalent of that value paid contemporaneously with
. the taking. Interest at a proper rate is a good
measure by which to ascertain the amount so to be
added. The legal rate of interest, as established
by the South Carolina statute was applied in this
case. This was a 'palpably fair and reasonable
method of performing the indispensable condition
to the exercise of the right of eminent domain,
namely, of making "just compensation" for the
land as it stands, at the time of taking.'. . .
"The addition of interest allowed by the District Court is necessary in order that the owner
shall not suffer loss and shall have 'just compensa13
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tion' to which he is entitled."
Again in Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265
U.S. 106, 44 S, Ct, 471, 68 L. ed. 934, the court said:
"And, if the taking precedes the payment of
compensation, the owner is entitled to such addition to the value at the time of the taking as will
produce the full equivalent of such value paid contemporaneously. Interest at a proper rate is a
good measure of the amount to be added/' (Italics
ours.)
The same rule was applied in United States v. Rogers,
255 U.S. 163, 41 S. Ct. 281, 65 L. ed. 566.
The Utah statute is of course silent with respect to
any allowance of interest, thus requiring application of
the foregoing rule.
Utah's condemnation statutes which implement these
constitutional minimum requirements are neither unique
nor unusual. Section 104-34-10 provides for the determination of the value of the property taken, and lays down
rules for determination of that value. The section following then provides that "the right thereto shall be deemed
to have accrued" to that value and is to be measured as
of the date of service of summons. Counterparts of these
provisions are found in California, Deering's 1941 Civil
Code, §§ 1249,1254; in the Idaho Code, §§ 7-712 and 7-717;
and in Montana Revised Codes 1935, §§ 9945 and 9952.
(a) On facts such as are here present, payment of
interest is required.
On facts similar to those pertaining to the Deere Es14
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tate property, and applying the identical Idaho statute
to a case where a large tract of land was condemned for
purposes connected with the American Falls Reservoir,
the Federal District Court squarely held that to the
award of the fair market value as of the date summons
was served should be added interest. United States v.
Brown, 279 F. 168. On cross writ of error from the award
of interest, the United States Supreme Court affirmed.
Brown v. United States, 263 U.S. 78, 68 L. ed. 171. The
court in part said;
"The district court, in directing the jury, followed the law of the state (Idaho Comp. Laws
1919, § 7415; Idaho Rev. Codes 1908, § 5221) in
which the land lay and the court was sitting, as follows :
"For the purpose of assessing compensation
and damages, the right thereto shall be deemed to
have accrued at the date of the summons, and its
actual value, at that date, shall be the measure of
compensation for all property to be actually taken.
. . . No improvements put upon the property subsequent to the date of the service of summons shall
be included in the assessment of compensation or
damages."
"The Idaho statute has been construed by the
circuit court of appeals of the ninth circuit to
justify the court in adding interest upon the value
fixed by the jury from the date of the summons
until the judgment. Weiser Valley Land & Water
Co. v. Ryan, 111 C C A . 221,190 Fed. 417, 424. The
court said:
"Having such right to compensation at a
given time, it would seem that the owner ought to
15
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have interest on the amount ascertained until paid.
In the meanwhile lie can claim nothing for added
improvements, nor is he entitled to any advance
that might affect the value of the property."
«* * # ^ 0 f { e n happens that in the delays incident to condemnation suits the loss to the owner
arising from the delay between the summons and
the vesting of title by judgment is a serious one.
The interest charge under the Idaho statute has
the wholesome effect of stimulating the plaintiff in
condemnation to prompt action. Moreover, the
plaintiff may reduce to a minimum the rents and
profits enjoyed by the defendant,, because, under
the Idaho statute, the plaintiff may have a summary preliminary hearing before commissioners to
fix probable damages, and by depositing the
amount so fixed with the clerk of the court, if the
defendant will not accept it, the plaintiff may obtain immediate possession. Within less than a
month after bringing suit, he can thus appropriate
to himself the rents and profits of the land, and
in enjoyment of them can await the final judgment.
2 Idaho Comp. Stat. 1919, § 7420; 2 Idaho Rev.
Codes 1908, § 5226."
A concise statement of the rule in such cases is found
in Duncan-Hood Corporation v. City of Summit, (N.J.),
146 Atl. 182, wherein the court states:
"The final ground for reversal urged is that
the trial court added to the verdicts, as returned
by the jury, interest from the date of the adoption
of the ordinance to the date of rendering the verdicts.
"This was not error. As before indicated, the
taking of the lands of respondents was as of and
from the date the ordinance in question became
16
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effective. At that date the damage, if any, to respondents arose and accrued, and they were entitled to be compensated as of that date. Such
compensation having been withheld, they were entitled to the amount thereof, together with interest
for the forbearance.
"For the reasons herein set forth, the judgments under review are reversed, and a venire de
novo awarded.
"For affirmance: None.
"For reversal: The CHANCELLOR, the
C H I E F J U S T I C E , Justices TRENCHARD,
P A R K E R , CAMPBELL, LLOYD, and CASE,
and Judges VAN BUSKIRK, McGLENNON,
KAYS, H E T F I E L D , and DEAR."
To these unanimous decisions of the federal district,
circuit and supreme courts involving the identical statutory provisions applied to facts similar to those in this
case, and to the opinion of the highest of the New Jersey
courts, we add the opinion of the Michigan Supreme Court
in an analogous situation. Campau v. City of Detroit, 196
N.W. 527, 32 A.L.R. 91. Here also land for a proposed
public park was involved, to be condemned under a procedure wherein the City had one years' time within which
to pay the award after it should be confirmed and thus
become final. Confirmation corresponded in the present
case to the date of the passage of Chapter 13, or at most
the date of service of summons, at which time the injury
and damages to the Deere Estate became fixed by virtue
of the legislative mandate.
In the Michigan case the owner claimed interest be17
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tween the date of "taking," and the date of actual payment of the award. As here, the condemnor tendered
the award without such interest, which the owner refused
to accept in full settlement. During the interim, as here,
the owner continued in possession, and the ordinance was
silent as to interest.
Interest was allowed, in view of the Federal Constitution and the similar provisions of the Michigan Constitution.
With the exception of the foregoing decisions directly
or by analogy in point, we have found no other applicable
determinations by courts of other jurisdictions. The reason is obvious, for almost invariably the taking in condemnation proceedings coincides with payment, or at a least
payment occurs within a reasonable time of the determination of the amount of compensation due. However, general discussions and annotations on the allowability of interest, even though the owner remains in possession, may
be found in connection with the Brown case at 68 L. ed.
171; in 96 A.L.E, 196, supplemented at 111 A.L.E. 1306,
paragraphs V I I I ( b ) ; 2 Lewis on Eminent Domain, 3d ed.,
§ 742, p. 1319; OrgePs Valuation under Eminent Domain,
§ 5, p. 17; 18 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain, § 275; and 29
C. J.S., Eminent Domain, § 176, where it is noted on page
1054 that "the mere fact of delay in bringing to a hearing
the determination of damage does not defeat the owner's
right to interest.''
It is respectfully submitted that justice, logic and
reason support the authorities above which under the
18
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facts of this particular case hold that the taking of the
owner's property and the injury and damage to the Deere
Estate here occurred June 18, 1951, or at least by July
12, 1951; and that accordingly interest subsequent to that
date should be allowed as a part of the just compensation
to make the owner whole. With respect to the wisdom of
the action taken by unequivocal mandate of Utah's legislature, we are not here concerned.
(b)

Utah is in accord.

This Court in the case of Fell v. Union Pacific ER.
Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 1003, 28 L.R.A. 1, reviewed extensively the reason for the allowance of interest, summarizing as follows:
"The true test to be applied as to whether interest should be allowed before judgment in a
given case or not is, therefore, not whether the
damages are unliquidated or otherwise, but
whether the injury and consequent damages are
complete and must be ascertained as of a particular time and in accordance with fixed rules of
evidence and known standards of value, which the
court or jury must follow in fixing the amount,
rather than be guided by their best judgment in assessing the amount to be allowed for past as well
as for future injury, or for elements that cannot
be measured by any fixed standards of value.

Here it will be noted that the three factors of the
"true test" were each present:
a.

The injury and consequent damage to the Deere
19
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Estate were complete June 18, 1951, or certainly when
summons was served July 12,1951;
b.

Damages were to be determined as of that par-

ticular time; and
c.

Damages were to be determined in accordance

with fixed rules of evidence.
Of course where there has been no damage and hence
the taking does not occur until the final condemnation
judgment, the tests outlined above are not met. Thus this
court has held that where the owners remain in continued
enjoyment of the property with no impairment as to its
use, there is no right to interest because there has been no
loss to be compensated. Such cases stand on their own
facts, e.g., Oregon Short Line BR. Co. v. Jones, 29 Utah
147, 80 P. 732, and Salt Lake & Utah RR. Co. v. Schramm,
56 Utah 53,189 P. 90. Here, we again reiterate, under the
facts of the peculiar legislative mandate and the applicable general statutes the Deere Estate was just as effectively deprived of its property June 18, 1951 or at least
by July 12, 1951 as if the State of Utah had then physically obtained possession. The injury and the damage
were then complete and the only thing remaining was to
determine the extent of that damage in accordance with
the fixed rules of evidence and the proceedings applicable to condemnation cases.
That no actual physical taking at all is necessary
w as the holding in the case of State v. Fourth Judicial
District, 94 Utah 384, 78 P. 2d 502, the court dividing,
r
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however, as to whether the facts in the particular case
constituted a taking.
How different the facts here, where to quote from
the supreme courts of Connecticut and Minnesota, the
owner, effective at least by July 12,1951, was "practically
deprived of his right to dispose of the land. His possession is precarious, liable to be terminated at any time; he
cannot safely rent; he cannot safely improve; if he sows,
he cannot be sure that he will reap." Clark v. Cox,
(Conn.) 56 Atl. 2d 512; Warren v. Railroad, 21 Minn. 424,
427.
From the facts in this case it is obvious that possession by the Deere Estate became worse than valueless
June 18, 1951 or certainly when summons was served.
Not only could the estate for practical purposes neither
dispose of, rent, improve, or farm the land; the owner
had to terminate the various improvement contracts and
then continue to maintain the utility pumps to avoid extensive damage to the water system without compensation
until the State eventually should conclude the act directed "forthwith" by the legislature, by inevitably taking legal title and possession.
(c)

A new trial is not required.

Mathematically, the interest on the fair market value
of the defendants' property between the date of the injury and the time when the amount of the award was determined can readily be computed. At six per cent it
amounts to $24,799.32 for the period July 12, 1951 until
21
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May 10, 1952.
This amount the court below could and should have
included in the judgment on the verdict, no jury question
being involved. St. Louis, etc. Ry. Co. v. Oliver (Okla.),
87 P. 423, 2 Lewis on Eminent Domain, § 742 at page 1324.
This error can be corrected by simple direction of
this court, no new trial or resubmission to the jury being
required.
Thus in Reed v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul RR.
Co. (C.C.), 25 F . 886, Mr. Justice Shiras said:
"Until the verdict is rendered it cannot be
known whether plaintiff may be entitled to interest. When this is determined by the amount of
the verdict, the court can then make the proper
order, and the same will form part of the adjudication, settling damages."
Accordingly on appeal the Circuit Court determined the
amount of interest to which plaintiff was entitled, added
this to the amount of the verdict as returned by the jury,
and rendered judgment for the aggregate amount.
Again, the case of Alloway v. Nashville, 88 Tenn. 510,
13 S.W. 123, 8 L.R.A. 123, was a condemnation proceeding. No instruction as to interest was given or requested
and none was allowed by the jury. Before judgment was
rendered Alloway moved the court to add interest, as
the defendants did here for the Deere E s t a t e ; and there
also the motion was rejected and on appeal such refusal
was assigned as error. The Supreme Court said:
22
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"Refusal to add interest was error. * * *
Inasmuch as the error can be readily corrected
here, that will be done, instead of reversing and
remanding. This court will render the judgment
that should have been rendered below."
See also Warren v. St. Paul & Pacific RE. Co., 21
Minn. 424, and Whiteacre v. St. Paul & Sioux RR, Co.,
24 Minn. 311, where the same practice is approved by the
Minnesota Supreme Court; and also 3 Elliott on Railroads, p. 1457, and 18 Am. Jur., Sec. 277.
Finally, although the cases and authorities are numerous enunciating the principle, we refer to the recent
opinion of this court in Morris v. Russell, 236 P. 2d 451,
w^here the same rule was invoked. References therein
were made to decisions in Oklahoma, Texas, Kentucky >
Illinois, and to another recent decision of this court in
Simmons v. Wilkin, 80 Utah 362,15 P. 2d 321.
Point.
2. The court improperly refused to allow these defendants to cross examine plaintiff's expert witnesses on the
subject of the actual market values of comparable property
as of July 12, 1951, and likewise excluded direct evidence as
to the actual market values of such comparable properties.
Plaintiff's witnesses all had had extensive experience and were familiar with the property under condemnation, as well as comparable properties and their
market values. They were each permitted accordingly to
express their opinion as to the fair market value of the
two parcels. For example, reference is made to the testimony of Witness Edward M. Ashton in this respect.
(S.R. 29-37.)
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On cross examination the court below absolutely
excluded defendant from testing the experts' opinions
on the basis of the market values of such comparable
lands. For example, Witness Ashton was asked with
respect to the adjacent Indian Hills Subdivision, and
objections to such line of questioning were sustained.
MR. B E H L E : I assume, for the record, I am
foreclosed in testing this witness in respect to
comparative values on any basis; front foot, acreage, per lot, as well as asking him in regard to his
subdivision ?
T H E COURT: Well, you may, unless there
is objection, proceed the same with him as you
did with Mr. Kiepe. Is that what you mean?
MR. B E H L E : Well, I thought the rulings
cut me off from any of that so I wanted to be sure.
In other words, I understand I can't ask the witness what land in the vicinity comparable to this
land sells for, either by an acre basis or a front
foot basis, or a lot basis, is that correct?
T H E COURT: Well, yes. I ruled against
you on that with Mr. Kiepe and I would do the
same with Mr. Ashton.
MR. B E H L E : Yes, sure. In other words, I
can't test on comparative sales, on comparative
sales prices?
T H E COURT: That is correct. You cannot.
(S.R. 40-41.)
I t will also be readily remembered that a large portion of the Deere Estate lands consisted of subdivided
24
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residential lots, more than twenty of which had been
sold to individual purchasers on the open market to
other defendants in the condemnation proceeding. Yet
the court below absolutely excluded direct evidence or
cross examination as to lot or acreage values of property
comparable to either the lots or acreage of the Deere
Estate.
MR. B E H L E : If the Court please, I think
the record is clear on our proffer of proof of
comparable values. I think the door has been
closed on us every time we have tried to prove
and test values, and here is a specific instance.
T H E COURT: Well, the only reason that the
door is closed to you is that the law provides
that you shall not do that and I try to follow
what the law is. I am not trying to close any
door on you and if you have any doubt about it
I can show you the authorities on the value of a
place. Well, that case Mr. Budge had the other
day covers that subject. It has not been permitted
and you persist in it and it is against the law.
MR. B E H L E : Well, of course, that is one
of the arguments we have been having right
along.
T H E COURT: Well, that is right. Of course
I have been ruling against you because I have
been ruling it is not lawful for you to divide this
property into lots, nor the price per lot, or any
other property into lots or the values of them.
(S.R. 42-43.)
MR. B E H L E : We also specifically tender
proof with respect to Indian Village as a com25
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parable subdivision purchased on an acreage basis
as raw acreage and the value per acre of $7,500.06
shortly before the date of condemnation and the
characteristics of that area as being comparable-.
MR. B U D G E : Same objection.
T H E COURT: The objection is sustained.
MR. B E H L E : For the record only we again
make a tender in connection with lot sales and
prices.
MR. B U D G E : Same objection.
T H E COURT: Within the area being condemned!
MR. B E H L E : Within the area and comparable to the area.
MR. B U D G E : Same objection.
T H E COURT: The objection is sustained.
(S.R. 52.)
We would have thought it clear that the best evidence of the market value of land, or for that matter
almost any tangible property with a market value, would
be the actual figures as to which that or comparable
property was selling for on the open market at about
the time of the valuation. 5 Nichols, Eminent Domain,
Ch. XXI. Certainly that is how one proves the value of
stocks active on the market, or one's automobile, or
home.
But here all such evidence was completely excluded
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—whether on a front-foot, lot, or acreage basis—under
a sweeping ruling by the court that all such evidence
was improper.
This court, in keeping with the Massachusetts doctrine or weight of opinion, is cited by Nichols (§21.3)
as in accord with the weight of opinion that such evidence
is admissible. Telluride Power Co. v. Bruneau, 41 Utah
4,125 P . 399.
The result of Judge Van Cott's ruling, which extended also to cross examination, was to leave before
the jury a naked opinion as to the value of two parcels
only, and for practical purposes to cut off and restrict
inquiry into just how such dollar figures were reached
by the testifying experts.
Defendants respectfully submit such errors require
reversal for the reasons so well expressed in St. Louis,
etc. BE. Co. v. Clark (Mo.), 25 S.W. 192, 26 L.R.A. 751,
as follows:
We think the evidence of sales of similar
property to that in question, made in the neighborhood, about the same time, was admissible to aid
the jury in determining the damage to which the
owner was entitled. The value of property is
ascertained largely from such sales, and the
opinions of witnesses as to values are largely
predicated upon them. It is best, when it can be
done, to put the jurors in possession of all the
facts from which values are ascertained, and allow
them to draw the conclusion therefrom. Witnesses
basing their opinion upon recent sales of like
property are liable to exaggerate or underesti27
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mate values; in any consideration they are no
more capable of deducing fair conclusions from
the known facts than the jury. The object is to
ascertain the general market value, and if particular sales are made under exceptional circumstances the fact can be shown, and the jury can
determine its probative force. Certainly no more
reliable method of determining the fair market
values of lands can be reached than that derived
from bona fide sales of similar lands in the
vicinity. The objection that such evidence raises
collateral issues as to the character of the land
sold, and the circumstances of such sales, is more
than compensated for by its value in aiding the
jury to a correct conclusion. (Italics ours.)
Point.
3. The court below improperly refused to allow appellants to introduce evidence relating to the fair market value
of the Deere Estate water utility system or any part thereof.
To prove the value of the Deere Estate water utility
system, defendants called as an expert witness Engineer C. J. Ullrich, who was intimately familiar with
and exceptionally well qualified to express an opinion
as to the value of that water system. This system consisted of a series of springs, an extensive collection and
storage system including dual electric pumps and two
large storage tanks, transmission lines to the various
points of use throughout the area under condemnation,
and then finally distribution lines into the residential
areas and other points of use. The witness described
the system in detail and testified that as an integrated
water utility it had been planned for immediate use in
the general Oak Hills area and for ultimate use else2b
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where after 1952, when Oak Hills was to be connected
with the Salt Lake City municipal water system. Objections were sustained to all questions with respect to the
value of that water system or of any part thereof.
(S.R. 9-14.) A tender of proof was rejected as to the
fair market value of that water system (exclusive of
land rights) being $74,200.00, assignable $10,500.00 to
the water rights and $63,700.00 to the balance of the
system, of which $25,700.00 was allocated to that part
of the distribution system within the streets of Parcel
I, these being the fair market values as of July 15, 1951.
(S.R. 16.)
No reason was .assigned for this exclusion, which
seems beyond comprehension when the general rule is
that such a utility not only may but must be valued by
witnesses who have "some peculiar means of forming
an intelligent and correct judgment as to the value of
the property in question." Thus it is said that the valuation by utility experts is "almost mandatory in all cases
since it is obvious that values cannot be based in such.
cases on sales or on values at which such property is
held in the vicinity." 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain,
§ 18.47.
Yet not only did the court exclude the opinion of
the only expert on water utility values; it permitted
lay real estate men to lump the utility's value in with
the land on the basis of indefinite hearsay discussions
"with the engineers in the City Water Department, the
most logical buyers." (S.R. 45.) It violated Sec. 104-34-10.
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Point.
4. The court improperly ruled that the property of
appellants under condemnation consisted of the whole of but
two separate parcels, each to be separately assessed.
a.

The Statutory Mandate:

As a matter of right, an owner whose property is
condemned is entitled under Utah law to a separate
assessment for each different parcel of his land that is
taken. He is also entitled as a matter of right to an
award for any net severance damages where there is
only a partial taking, in addition to the value of the
part taken. The policy laid down by Utah's legislature
is to assess separately for each source of damages as
far as practical.
104-34-10. Compensation
Assessed.

and

damages—How

The court, jury or referee must hear such
legal evidence as may be offered by any of the
parties to the proceedings, and thereupon must
ascertain and assess:
(1) The value of the property sought to be
condemned and all improvements thereon appertaining to the realty, and of each and every
separate estate or interest therein; and if it cow,sists of different parcels, the value of each parcel
and of each estate or interest therein shall be
separately assessed.
(2) / / the property sought to be condemned
constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the
damages which will accrue to the portion not
30
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sought to be condemned by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned
and the construction of the improvement in the
maimer proposed by the plaintiff.
(5) As far as practicable compensation must
be assessed for each source of damages separately.
(Ch. 8, Laws of Utah 1951). (Italics ours.)
As pointed out in the opinions in the case of State
v. Fourth District Court, 78 P. 2d 502, 94 Utah 384, the
extent and measure of damages under Utah law goes
beyond strict constitutional guaranties; and although
these provisions have been on the statute books of Utah,
California, Montana and Idaho, among other states, for
many decades, their mandate is so clear and unequivocal
that there have been few cases with respect thereto, especially in recent times.
b.

What Constitutes a "Separate Parcel":

Decision as to what constitutes a separate parcel to
be separately assessed is ordinarily a question of law
for the court to determine, since the determinative physical facts are generally not in dispute. But if there is
a conflict as to these facts, a question of fact is presented
for determination by the jury or court, as the case may
be. 2 Lewis on Eminent Domain (3d ed.) § 701; St. Paul
& Sioux City E E . Co. v. Murphy, 19 Minn. 500.
The three criteria in determining what constitutes
a separate parcel within the meaning of the Utah Statute
seem to be (1) common ownership, (2) physical contiguity, and (3) common use. All three factors usually must
31
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be present, and as stated in Lewis, § 698:
"In general it is so much as belongs to the
same proprietor as that taken, and is continuous
with it and used together for a common purpose."
In the case of the Deere Estate, on the basis of the
issues drawn and the record before the court there was
no question as to ownership; the factors in question
were those as to contiguity and common use. The evidence was not in conflict, as we see it, and thus the matter
became a question of law. But before looking to the
various parts of the entire tract taken of more than
thirteen city blocks—roughly, an area equivalent to that
between North Temple and 8th South, and from State
Street to West Temple Street, let us review further
the authorities.
Lewis at Section 699, discussing residential areas,
states (italics o u r s ) :
If two or more contiguous city or village
lots are improved and used as one tract, and
any part of any one is taken, the owner may
recover the damage to all; so, where a tract is
subdivided into lots and blocks, but continues to
be used as before for agricultural purposes, the
subdivision being a mere paper one. In the last
case it is intimated that a different rule might
prevail if the lots were merely held for sale.
Contiguous lots improved for separate use are
not one tract. * * * Where a block is divided by a
street, the parts become distinct tracts as to each
other where they are merely held for sale or use
as building lots. It is held that the subdivision
of land into lots, makes each lot, prima facie, a
32
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separate and distinct tract, and if the owner
claims damages to all or more than the lot taken,
he must produce evidence to overcome this presumption. The true rule would seem to be that
lots and blocks improved or used for a common
purpose should be regarded as one tract, though
divided by a street or alley; that contiguous lots
in the same block or square should be regarded
as one tract, though vacant and held for sale or
speculation; that lots improved for separate use
should in general be regarded as separate tracts;
but that if contiguous lots devoted to a separate
use are more valuable for a common use they
might properly be regarded as one tract: and that
vacant lots and blocks, held for sale or speculation
and separated by streets or alleys should be regarded as distinct tracts.
The foregoing text is amply annotated by cases from
various jurisdictions. The statements are substantially
the same as those found in other standard works. F o r
example, it is said in 18 Am. Jur. "Eminent Domain",
Sec. 270:
* * *In determining what constitutes a separate and independent parcel of land, when the
property is actually used and occupied, unity of
use is the principal test, and if a tract of land,
no part of which is taken, is used in connection
with the same farm, or the same manufacturing
establishment, or the same enterprise of any other
character as the tract, part of which was taken, it
is not considered a separate and independent parcel merely because it was bought at a different
time, and separated by an imaginary line, or even
if the two tracts are separated by a highway,
railroad or canal. * # *
When parts of the same establishment are
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separated by intervening private land, they are
considered as independent parcels, unless they
are so inseparably connected in the use to which
they are applied that the injury or destruction
of one must necessarily and permanently injure
the other. So also, contiguous tracts owned by
the same person, but used for different purposes
and rented to different tenants, should be considered as separate tracts. If both are injured
by the taking, it is proper to permit the jury to
consider the reasonable market value of each
tract. Even if two tracts are contiguous and
owned by the same owner and used for the same
purpose, if they are not used in connection with
each other, they must be considered as separate
tracts, as, for example, a block of city houses
rented to different tenants for residential purposes. Vacant and unoccupied land is considered
to be separated into independent parcels by a
public street, whatever the intention of the owner
in regard to future use. A mere platting into
blocks and lots has been held sufficient in the case
of vacant land to show, prima facie, at least, a
division into separate and independent parcels;
although as to this there is authority to the contrary.
See also Corpus Juris, Eminent Domain, Section 395;
the annotation in 57 L.R.A. 937, at page 940; and the
cases and comment in 2 American Railroad & Corporation
Reports 184.
Somewhat the same problem is presented in connection with the requirements that real property be
assessed for ad valorem tax purposes by "parcels or
subdivisions not exceeding six hundred forty acres each
* * V Utah Code, §80-5-8. The following case applies
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the rule quoted above in connection with such tax statutes :
Generally, several lots in the same block,
contiguous to each other and owned by the same
person, are deemed one "parcel" of land within
contemplation of statute requiring full cash value
of each "parcel" of land attached to be set down
in assessment roll. Code 1930, § 69-242, subd. 4.
Guthrie v. Harm, Or., 76 P. 2d 292, 294.
The same problem also is presented where in mortgage or execution sales, and in order to realize a higher
amount for the debtor, real property consisting of several
known lots or "parcels" is to be sold "separately and not
as a unit."
The recent Utah case of Commercial Bank v. Madsen,
236 P. 2d 343, again applies the same rule set forth above
as to condemnation and tax assessment. In that case two
contiguous lots owned by the same debtor and in use as a
"unified parcel" were held to be the proper subject of a
single sale. In that case, as the court pointed out,—
The bank prepared and accepted a mortgage
of this property as one parcel; in its pleadings,
judgment, notice of sale and throughout the entire
proceeding it was treated by the bank as one
parcel of property. The sheriff and two other witnesses all testified that they considered the land
as a. single parcel of property. The judgment
debtor testified to the effect that he did not object
to the sale as a unit and that he had no reason to
think more money could be raised if the lots were
sold separately. The fact that the land is described
as "Lots 1 and 2 of block 28, Plat A Manti City
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Survey" does not serve to make separate tracts
of an otherwise unified parcel. For a discussion
to the effect that description of property by lots
does not serve to make it separate parcels, see:
33 C. J.S., Executions, § 210, p. 449.
Finally, we quote from Volume 4 of Nichols' work
on Eminent Domain, the third edition of which has just
been published:
§14.31.

What constitutes

a separate

parcel.

Difficult questions sometimes arise in determining what constitutes a separate or independent
parcel or tract of land. There are a few definite
rides of law that can be laid down. In many cases
the court can, as a matter of law, determine that
lots are distinct or otherwise, but ordinarily it is
a practical question to be decided by the jury or
other similar tribunal which passes upon matters
of fact, which should consider evidence on the use
and appearance of the land, its legal divisions
and the intent of its owner and conclude whether
on the whole the lots are separate or not. In such
cases the land itself rather than the map should
be looked at, and one part of a parcel is not to be
considered separate and independent merely because it was bought at a different time from the
rest and is separated from it by an imaginary line.
(1)

Physical

contiguity.

Actual contiguity between two separate parcels is ordinarily essential to merit consideration
as a unified tract. Actual physical separation by
an intervening space between two parcels belonging to the same owner is ordinarily ground for
holding that the parcels are to be treated as independent of each other, but it is not necessarily a
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conclusive test. If the land is actually occupied
or in use the unity of the use is the chief criterion.
When two parcels are physically distinct there
must be such a connection or relation of adaptation, convenience and actual and permanent use
as to make the enjoyment of one reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the other in the most
advantageous manner in the business for which
it is used, to constitute a single parcel within
the meaning of the rule. Accordingly, a public
highway actually wrought and travelled, a railroad, a canal, or a creek running through a large
tract devoted to one purpose does not necessarily
divide it into independent parcels, provided the
owner has the legal right to cross the intervening
strip of land or water. But a public highway will
ordinarily divide the land of a single owner into
separate parcels, even if both parcels are used for
the same purpose, if the use upon each parcel
is separate and independent of that upon the other.

When land is unoccupied and so not devoted
to use of any character, and especially when it
is held for purposes of sale in building lots, a
physical division by wrought roads and streets
creates independent parcels as a matter of law.
* * * (Italics ours.)
c. Appellants have not Waived their Right for Separate Assessments.
Throughout the trial and also by its application to
this court for an interlocutory appeal, appellants asserted their right to separate assessments for each parcel.
Thus the right has not been waived, as did occur in Idaho
under an identical statute where likewise a large area
of land was condemned for reservoir purposes. In the
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case of Big Lost River Irr. Co. v. Davidson (Ida.), 121
P . 88, 92, it was said:
Under the provisions of the statute it was
not necessary that the jury should find the value
of each legal subdivision of the tract sought to
be condemned. If, however, there is more than
one parcel of land, or several separate parcels
or tracts, each separated from the other, then
it is necessary for the jury to determine the value
of each separate tract or parcel. But where the
tract is a single or consolidated tract, the value
then may be fixed as a single parcel or tract.
"Parcel" or "tract" of land, as used in this section, does not mean legal subdivision, but a consolidated body of land, and the finding of the
jury may be upon each single parcel or tract of
land.

d.

The Physical Facts in this Case:

Applying the foregoing law to the physical facts of
the Deere Estate, we find that in the tract—more than
thirteen large city blocks in area—there are not only
recorded plats of lots and blocks, and the actual physical
improvements constituting a subdivision, namely, streets,
curb and gutter, drainage, fire hydrants, utilities, etc.
Here we have further physical barriers such as mountain
streams and the steep slopes and cliffs of Emigration
Canyon. Sections of the Deere Estate property are more
than a mile apart. Specifically:
(1) There is an area of 50.60 acres described on
the map as Tracts II, IV-C and VI, which is essentially
hillside land. As to this area there are the required
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requisites of common ownership, use and contiguity.
In connection with this area will be involved the value
Together this would constitute one "parcel", the land and
the water utility system to be each separately assessed.
(2) There is an area of 5.81 acres known as Tract
V which is completely segregated from the other property
owned by these defendants and wherein there is both
common ownership and use. This area is more than half
the size of Temple Square, and is a separate "parcel."
(3) There is a third separate parcel of 7.35 acres
known as Tract I I I which has been developed and is zoned
for commercial purposes. I t is segregated from other
areas by other ownerships on the east, by the state and
county roads on the north and west, and by Emigration
Canyon and Creek on the south.
(4) South of Emigration Creek Canyon are Tracts
I-D and IV-B, each of which is divided roughly east and
west by a dedicated street—Kennedy Drive.
(a) Tract I-D consists of a total of 6.65 acres.
Of this, 1.5 acres is in the extreme southwest corner of the
entire tract to be condemned. Obviously severance damages are involved. The same situation pertains to the
south part of Tract IV-B. This consists of 5.43 acres arbitrarily cut out by a straight line division from the heart of
a tier of proposed residential lots. It is suggested that
each of these two is p a r t of a larger parcel extending
to the south wherein severance damages would be involved, and that each should be segregated from the
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balance of the other land of these defendants which has
been taken.
(b) The remaining area of Tract I-D north of Kennedy Drive consists of 5.51 acres. The remaining area
of Tract IV-B north of Kennedy Drive consists of 10.33
acres—slightly in excess of the area of a large city block.
If treated as separate parcels, no severance damages
would be involved. It will be recalled that this p a r t of
I-D comprises ten potential residential lots for which
all utilities have been installed to the extent planned by
the subdividers; while this part of area IV-B consists
of 10.33 acres suitable and planned for residential development, but wherein no utilities or other improvements have been constructed except for Kennedy Drive.
Under the authorities, together this entire contiguous
area constituted another "parcel."
(5) Tract IV-A is an area equal to nearly two city
blocks—19.62 acres—on the extreme north of the entire
tract herein condemned. As in the case of IV-B, it is
suitable for and had been planned for residential development. However no utilities had yet been installed
and the only actual development on the ground had been
construction of a dividing access road in place—Oakhills
Eoad, and an access road to the J e r r y Jones property
extending north from Oakhills Eoad opposite Lot 62
owned by W. E. Graham.
(a) The property to the east of the J e r r y Jones
road consists of a total of 7.77 acres divided into twentyone lots and streets actually constructed and existing
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but not yet dedicated. Of this area Lots 62, 63, 64 and
65 had been sold to other defendants prior July 12,
1951, the area so sold involving 1.13 acres and road
access rights. These defendants owned the remaining
lots and the roads comprising a total of 6.64 acres, constituting another "separate parcel."
(b) The tract west of the J e r r y Jones road consists
of 34 lots and streets actually in place although not
dedicated. This area which we submit constitutes a separate and different parcel comprises a total of 11.85
acres—more than a large city block in extent, all of which
is owned by these defendants.
6. Finally, there is the balance of the areas denominated in the Bray ton affidavits, the answer and by the
various maps as Tracts I-A, I-B and I-C. Here all utilities are in, and the property actually existed as a number
of separate residential lots. The law seems clear that a
separate parcel is involved prima facie for each lot, and
at least for each group of contiguous lots.
The total acreage owned by these defendants in Tract
I-A is 7.51; in Tract I-B, 14.1; and in Tract I-C, 3.96.
Tract I-C is a separate parcel because there the subdivision was not physically complete; but in I-A were
19 separate lots, and 41 separate lots in I-B. Grouping
the contiguous lots as was done in requested Instruction
No. 12 (R. 103), there would be 12 "separate parcels"
in I-A and I-B as follows:
a.

Lots 1 and 2, Block 1, Oak Hills Plat A.
41

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

b. Lot 1, Block 2, Oak Hills Plat A.
c. Lots 5, 6, 7 and 8, Block 2, Oak Hills Plat A.
d. Lots 2, 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8, Block 3, Oak Hills Plat A.
e. Lots 1, 2 and 3, Block 4, Oak Hills Plat A.
f.

Lot 6, Block 4, Oak Hills Plat A.

g. Lots 8 and 9, Block 4, Oak Hills Plat A.
h. Lot 11, Block 4, Oak Hills Plat A.
i. Lots 5 and 6, Oak Hills Plat B.
j.

Lots 10,11 and 12, Oak Hills Plat B.

k. Lots 69 to 82, Oak Hills Plat B.
1. Lots 85 to 106, inclusive, Oak Hills Plat B.
In summary then, as a matter of law under Section
104-34-10, the property of these defendants under condemnation consisted of nineteen separate parcels, each to
be separately assessed under mandate of Utah's legislature; and in addition the north parts of two additional
separate parcels. In these last two cases the statutory
mandate was that each of the parts taken was to be
separately assessed; and then there was also to be determined the extent of any severance damages to the remaining parts of the two parcels involved.
e. The effect of the two-parcel decision.
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At the oral hearing on the application for an interlocutory appeal from the two-parcel order, Mr. Justice
Crockett inquired as to just how condenmees were being
prejudiced by the claimed violation of the statutory
requirements, and why we should assume that Judge Van
Cott would commit prejudicial error in the course of the
trial. These questions were difficult if not impossible
then to answer, but appellants' fears were fully justified
by subsequent rulings of the court below as a consequence
of the early decision.
For example, plaintiff's witnesses were permitted
to assume that since only two sales were to be made
of the two parcels each as a whole, necessarily from the
nature of the parcels the purchasers would be buying
wholesale at a discount in order to obtain profits by
resale of the individual lots and tracts. Thus, for example, Witness Ashton's opinion started with an assumption
that normal fair market values of the various components
of the entire property totaled some $667,000.00. (Supp.
K. 39.) Then by applying these assumptions he reduced
this total for the two parcels to $491,250.00. (S.E. 33.)
This was substantially the figure adopted by the jury.
(R. 118.)
Also as a consequence of the two-parcel decision,
the court excluded either on direct or cross examination
all evidence as to lot values or evidence of any comparable values at all. (S.E. 17, and Point 2 above.) The
defendants were simply unable to support the figures
claimed in their stricken separate answer as to the fair
market values of the individual tracts or parcels con43
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stituting their land which was being condemned. The
effect was to condemn not the property taken, but the
owners because of the large extent of their holdings.
To illustrate, a defendant owning a single lot in Oak
Hills is afforded compensation to the extent of its full
market value. The Deere Estate, owning the identical
adjacent lot, is cut in two by reason of the application
of the wholesale discounts, etc. If the ownership of the
two lots were to be reversed, by reason of this change
alone the values would reverse and the former individually owned lot would be reduced to half its value,
while the Deere Estate lot would be doubled.
Likewise as to land suitable for subdivision but not
yet so subdivided. Mr. Ashton would pay $7500.00 per
acre for a 6-acre tract, but because the Deere Estate
owned many more times that acreage, the value of its
land by virtue of wholesale discounts and a single sale,
etc., would be diminished to $2500.00 per acre.
Finally, the court excluded the entire issue of severance damages, since under its ruling the w^hole of only
two parcels was to be condemned and there was no room
for severance damages for a partial taking as provided
by the statute. (R. 39, 43.)

Appellants can now answer the questions of the
court at the hearing on the interlocutory appeal by
stating categorically that the failure of the court belowT
to follow the statutory provisions with respect to the
mandatory assessment of each separate parcel and the
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determination of severance damages in the case of partial
takings reduced the amount of the award of damages
by perhaps $200,000.00.
f.

Utah Cases:

We find no Utah cases in point except by inference
on the reverse of the facts here, the cases of Commercial
Bank v. Madsen, supra, and Provo Eiver Water Users
Association v. Carlson, 133 P. 2d 777, 103 Utah 93. In
this latter case condemnee urged that by reason of his
ownership and common use of two non-contiguous tracts,
severance damages to the tract not condemned were involved in connection with a taking of but part of a single
parcel. However, on the facts of that case and in view
of the non-contiguity the majority of this court reversed
the decision of the court below, holding that two separate
parcels were involved with a complete taking of one
and no severance damages allowable as to the other.
The difference between these cases, it is respectfully
submitted, is readily apparent from a glance at the maps
and a cursory knowledge of the supporting facts. Here
there were many separate parcels involved. The effect
of the court's two-parcel decision, let alone plaintiff's
claim that all was a single parcel, was to deprive the
owners of their right to just compensation. The rulings
of the court, it is respectfully submitted, were in viola
tion of the well-known due process and equal protection
clauses of Utah's Constitution, Article I, Sections 7, 22,
24, 26 and 27, as well as a flagrant violation of Section
103-34-10.
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Likewise was violated the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution requiring payment of just
compensation for the property taken. This has been
held to be "the full and perfect equivalent of the property
taken." Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States,
261 U.S. 299, 43 S. Ct. 354, 67 L. ed. 664. But no such
compensation is being paid in this instance.
Point.
5. The court improperly eliminated the issue of severence damages.
The issue of severance damages, as in the case of
interest as a part of just compensation, is a matter separate and apart from that of the proper determination
of the fair market value of the land actually taken.
As discussed at length under Point 4, the court
determined that the whole of each of two separate parcels
was being condemned. Hence it ruled that under Section
104-34-10 of the Judicial Code there was no place for
the allowance of any severance damages. The issue was
stricken from the pleadings by eliminating defendants'
averments as to such severance damages set forth in
their answer (R. 39, 41, 43), and the issue was not
submitted to the jury (R. 102).
Apart from the court's determination on other points
in this appeal, it is respectfully submitted that this case
should be remanded to the trial court with instructions
to reinstate the pleadings as to the issue of severance
damages, and to proceed to hear and determine such
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issue.
IV.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that under the requirement of the Federal and State Constitutions the just
compensation to be paid these defendants under the
facts of this particular case require payment of not
only the fair market value of the property taken, but
also interest computed at the legal rate in order to compensate the owner for his damage from July 12, 1951
when his injury occurred, until May 10, 1952 when the
amount became payable.
I t is further submitted that the foregoing constitutional requirements as well as statutory directives have
also been violated by reason of the outlined prejudicial
errors committed by the trial court, resulting in depriving the owners from an award of just compensation for
their property. Accordingly, in this respect the judgments of the lower court should be reversed and a new
trial ordered.
C. C. PARSONS, .
A. D. MOFFAT,
CALVIN A. B E H L E ,
Attorneys for Appellants
and Defendants.
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